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T
he Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC)
reduced its target for the federal funds rate to effec-
tively zero in December 2008. At its August 2011
meeting, the FOMC announced that it “currently anticipates
that economic conditions…are likely to warrant exception-
ally low levels for the funds rate at least through mid-2013.”1
If this does happen, the funds rate will have been essentially
zero for at least four and a half years. This essay points out
a potential adverse consequence of this interest rate policy
and the simple way that the FOMC could avoid it.
Economists often discuss an interest rate relationship
known as the Fisher equation, which says that the nominal
interest rate is equal to the real interest rate plus the expected
rate of inflation. At the level of an individual economic
agent, the Fisher equation is essentially tautological: No one
who wants to receive a positive real rate of return would
invest in a bond yielding a nominal interest rate of, say, 
2 percent if they expected the inflation rate over the hold-
ing period of the bond to be 2 percent or higher. In this
case, the expected return on such an investment would be
zero or negative. The Fisher relationship is thought to hold
reasonably well in the aggregate also. Indeed, it is essentially
used to extract forward-looking inflation expectations by
comparing rates on Treasury coupon bonds with rates on
Treasury inflation-protected securities (TIPS) of compara-
ble maturity.
To see how the FOMC’s interest rate policy and the
Fisher relationship can yield an unfavorable result, it is
important to note that most economists believe that eco-
nomic agents are rational—in the sense that inflation expec-
tations will converge to the actual rate of inflation in the
“long run.” That is, over a sufficiently long period of time
(the long run), the expected rate of inflation should equal
the actual rate of inflation. If inflation expectations converge
to actual inflation, the FOMC zero interest rate policy
implies that (i) both the real rate and the inflation rate will
be zero or (ii) one of the two will be positive and the other
negative. The problem, of course, is that it’s difficult to
envision an expanding economy where the real rate is zero
or negative.
If the real rate is positive, the inflation rate that is con-
sistent with the FOMC’s zero interest rate policy in the long
run would need to be negative. Now, there is nothing wrong
with a negative equilibrium rate of inflation per se.2 How -
ever, historically speaking, persistent negative rates of infla-
tion have been often associated with anemic economic
growth (e.g., Japan and the Great Depression). Indeed, Jim
Bullard, president of the St. Louis Fed, has suggested that
the FOMC’s “extended period” language “may be increasing
the probability of a Japanese-style outcome for the United
States”—i.e., with interest rates near zero, deflation, and
anemic economic growth. 
Bullard discusses this issue in the context of a theoretical
model that has two equilibriums: a good equilibrium where
the policy rate is positive and a bad equilibrium where the
policy rate is zero.3 In the model the policy rate can get stuck
in the bad equilibrium, with nothing in the dynamics of
the model that would get out of the bad equilibrium once
it got there. This result is undoubtedly determined by the
specific characteristics of the model. In the real world of
policymaking, however, there is nothing to prevent policy-
makers from getting out of this situation. And the reason
is simple: The policy rate is an administered rate—i.e., one
that policymakers choose. The FOMC can raise the rate
above zero now or presumably at any time in the future.
All it needs to do is to reduce the supply of credit through
open market sales of assets. Indeed, two central banks—
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have already increased their policy rates from their finan-
cial crisis/recession lows. The European Central Bank
increased its policy rate 50 basis points and the Bank of
Canada increased its policy rate by 75 basis points.
For economists, the long run, medium run, and short
run are conceptual periods of time that are linked to the
details of economic theory but are difficult to define pre-
cisely in terms of calendar time. In some applications, the
long run might be a few months; in others, a period of years.
By keeping the funds rate at zero for the past 26 months
and suggesting that it will maintain the zero rate for another
two years, the FOMC is effectively saying that the long run
for the convergence of inflation expectations to a rate that
is consistent with its zero interest rate policy is longer than
4.5 years. This seems exceptionally long. Alternatively, the
FOMC might anticipate that inflation expectations will be
stabilized close to their implied inflation objective of about
2 percent. Hence, the only outcome that is consistent with
the Fisher equation holding and the FOMC’s zero interest
rate policy is that the long run is considerably longer than
4.5 years. ■
1 FOMC press release, August 9, 2011.
2 Milton Friedman once suggested that the optimal equilibrium rate of inflation
was negative—in particular, equal to the negative of the economy’s real growth
rate.
3 James Bullard, “Seven Faces of “The Peril,” Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
Review, September/October 2010, 92(5), pp. 339-52. Bullard refers to this paper:
Benhabib, Jess; Schmitt-Grohé, Stephanie and Uribe, Martín. “The Perils of Taylor
Rules.” Journal of Economic Theory, January 2001, 96(1-2), pp. 40-69.
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